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Abstract  
Blockchain technology has received much attention in the media and there is an increasing interest amongst or-
ganizations within financial services due to the potential benefits. As blockchain-based systems are a nascent 
technology, the requirements of the technology need to be understood, to allow blockchain systems to be success-
fully integrated within financial service organizations. There are gaps in academic research in understanding how 
managers evaluate the value of a blockchain-based system. This study develops a model to explain manager re-
sistance to implementing blockchain-based systems in financial services organizations. This research advances 
the theoretical understanding of managers’ perspectives on blockchain-based systems and models their resistance 
to blockchain technology. 
 












Blockchain has traditionally been associated with Bitcoin; the reason being its initial conceptualisation by Satoshi 
Nakamoto in 2008 as the core technology behind the bitcoin cryptocurrency (Mai et al., 2018; Zhao et al., 2016). 
Over time, blockchain has slowly moved away from its origins as being based in cryptocurrency, to one where it 
is used in a variety of technologies and applications (Beck et al., 2018; Kewell and Ward, 2017). As its potential 
uses have increased, this has created some ambiguity in academia as to the exact definition of the concept and its 
applications, and questions are raised as to whether it is more financially viable than current solutions (Rimba etc 
al., 2018). Similarly, in industries such as financial services, there is a lack of an industry wide definition and 
usage, with many organisations implementing their own proprietary solutions (de Kruijff and Weigand, 2017; 
Holotiuk et al., 2018, b).  
At a simple level, the blockchain is a new means of storing data. As its name suggests, the blockchain is a chain 
of blocks with each block containing transaction data (Zheng et al., 2017). The core element of the block is that 
the block also contains a reference to the block that precedes it; this effectively means that it is possible to trace 
back though all the blocks (and the transactions stored) all the way back to the first block in the chain (Beck et al., 
2018). To ensure that no blocks are tampered with, thus preserving the integrity of all transactions, hashing algo-
rithms are used to ensure that the blocks are kept secure from alterations. If the block, or any preceding block, is 
altered then the hash no longer represents the block and it is obvious that tampering has occurred (Swan, 2015). 
To ensure that the blockchain is virtually unbreakable, the blockchain is not provided and maintained by a single 
server. It is maintained in a large network of computers as a distributed ledger. All of these computers work to-
gether to maintain and expand the blockchain; these participating computers are often called miners and work 
through consensus (Xu et al., 2017). 
As the technology behind blockchain has found applications outside of cryptocurrencies, it is predicted to evolve 
from Blockchain 1.0 for digital currency, Blockchain 2.0 for digital finance, to Blockchain 3.0 for digital society 
(Zhao et al., 2016). Friedlmaier et al. (2016) note that while Blockchain is being investigated across many indus-
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tries, financial services is one where it’s very prominently represented. Indeed, Blockchain has generated signifi-
cant enthusiasm and interest in financial services (Shrier et al., 2016; Zachariadas et al., 2019). Many financial 
service organizations are interested in blockchain technology as they assume it may be the next big thing to revo-
lutionize the financial services sector (Beck & Müller-Bloch, 2017; Cong and He, 2019). These organizations 
believe there are a multitude of benefits on offer from using a blockchain system, including more efficient pro-
cesses, increases in security, privacy, reliability and speed, to name a few (Planksy et al. 2016; Beck & Müller-
Bloch, 2017). As blockchain systems are gaining traction in the market as an exciting technological development, 
financial services companies are beginning to recognise the potential blockchain could bring about (Brenig, 
Schwarz & Rückeshäuser, 2016). Blockchain is viewed not as just another technology, but as the next Internet 
revolution (Tapscott & Tapscott, 2016). Many have begun investing in blockchain technologies, both in-house as 
proof-of-concepts and also indirectly through start-up investment (Walsh et al., 2016).  
Despite blockchain systems disruptive potential, little is known about how blockchain systems will be diffused 
successfully within financial organizations (Lindman et al., 2017; Harris and Wonglimpiyarat, 2019), their impact 
upon people and tasks and what reasons might motivate managers in organizations to oppose adopting a blockchain 
technology. This study investigates what those reasons may be. New technology brings many challenges to organ-
isations as it changes how people work and the tasks they must perform. Even before the impact of technology, 
change was recognised as problematic for people, as change hurts (Robbins & Finley, 1998). Resistance to change 
impacts on many projects and organisations, to the extent that “probably one of the key skills required of managers 
in today’s organizations is the ability to manage change” (Cushway & Lodge, 1999, p.180). Lacity (2018) de-
scribes how beyond the technical challenges, there are “daunting management challenges” that must be overcome 
before blockchain’s potential can be fully realised; a concern arises though when managers themselves resist 
change. Managers in organisations are critical to change, but their resistance to change is overlooked as a research 
topic (Giangreco, 2005). A. Tapscott (2016) asks who in the financial services industry will lead paradigm shift to 
blockchain? Leaders have traditionally been slow to embrace changes to the status quo, and reserachers (Clohessy, 
Acton, Godfrey, and Houston (2018); and Tveita and Borander (2018) identify how management support is crucial 
to the successful adoption of blockchain. 
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The next section reviews blockchain-based systems within the financial services sector, blockchain adoption hur-
dles and resistance to change literature. Specifically, the section focuses on status quo bias theory towards devel-
oping a theoretical insight on the key motivations for managers resisting change from the status quo to a block-
chain-based system. This enabled the creation of a manager’s resistance to blockchain model and underpinning 
hypotheses for testing.  
2.  Blockchain and resistance 
In the financial services sector, large organizations are forging partnerships with blockchain consortia. Financial 
institutions in these consortia perceive that blockchain technologies have the potential to significantly reduce the 
complexity of back-office procedures, replacing legacy systems and expensive databases. Blockchain systems 
support quick transaction settlement and clearing, while enhancing fraud protection and anti-money laundering 
protection. These benefits have been the key motivators behind financial institutions investigating blockchain sys-
tems to increase efficiency and reduce costs (Baker and Werbach, 2019; Glaser, 2017; Tsai et al., 2016; Tapscott 
& Tapscott, 2016). 
However, before blockchain systems can be incorporated within financial organizations IT infrastructure, there 
will need to be an integration process to ensure that blockchain-based systems can be successfully integrated within 
the mainstream ecosystem and enables adherence to regulatory and data protection requirements. Issues such as 
integration, data standardization, regulation and scalability of blockchain systems will need to be addressed before 
blockchain systems will have wide spread adoption within financial services (Hughes et al, 2019; Beck & Müller-
Bloch, 2017; Betzwieser et al., 2019). A concern arises though where, without addressing resistance to the adoption 
of blockchain, integration will not succeed. Discussions on blockchain transforming the payments industry talk 
about blockchain’s possibilities in the ‘near future’, yet there has not been a wide adoption of the technology 
(Neyer & Geva, 2017). Despite the hype around blockchain, major barriers stand in the way of its adoption (Iansiti 
& Lakhani, 2017).  
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2.1 Blockchain Adoption Hurdles 
Research conducted by Kot (2019) found that there remained major roadblocks to Blockchain adoption in financial 
services, including scalability issues, governance, and policy shortcomings. The factors which influence the adop-
tion of Blockchain by organisations can be broken into five dimensions – technology (e.g. Prototyping problems, 
efficiency, implementation, the role of IT and interplay with business), organization (e.g. integration, formal and 
informal exchange, cross-functional teams, and attitude), people (e.g. partnerships, distributed knowledge, mind-
set, need for developers), project management (e.g. Bottom-up and Top-down approaches, motivation, and respon-
sibility) and environmental (e.g. standardization, availability of use-cases, and uncertainty) Friedrich Holotiuk and 
Jürgen Moormann (2018).  
This aligns with earlier research done in Asia-Pacific organizations by State Street and Oxford Economics who 
found that there is a lack of readiness for blockchain systems (State Street, 2016)..This illustrates that there is a 
lack of knowledge and experience in relation to blockchain systems, particularity around the transition to block-
chain systems in a financial services setting (State Street, 2016). 
One of the issues preventing blockchain systems from becoming widely adopted within mainstream financial ser-
vices is that the technology is deemed immature (Radanović, I., Likić, 2018) and there are certain risks that come 
from adopting an innovative radical technology like blockchain (Beck & Müller-Bloch, 2017). Process change 
will always require a new culture (Bossavit, 2002), and blockchain changes existing culture and processes as cus-
tomers are going to be placing trust in the Blockchain ecosystem to secure their data and verify their electronic 
transactions (Crosby et al., 2016; Beck et al., 2016; Lindman, et al., 2017). Until it is widely used, there will be 
resistance to, even rejection of, the use of blockchain as it is such an extreme change (Mougayar, 2016). For 
example, Benbunan-Fich and Castellanos (2018) describe how blockchain disrupts the status quo in public services 
and that mechanisms to overcome resistance are needed. In addition, managers work in, or create, organisation 
that are hierarchical, insular, and vertically integrated; blockchain will challenge this status quo and even eliminate 
some managerial functions (D. Tapscott & Tapscott, 2017). 
Chatfield and Reddick (2019) posit that incumbent organisations, experience a Status Quo Bias when it come to 
the adoption of Blockchain solutions. This is the result of technological uncertainty and issues with security and 
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privacy. Their study focused on adoption of distributed ledger technology in central banks and determined that 
there is no imminent future full deployment of DLT-based platforms for the central banking core functions in high-
volume and high-value payments, clearing, and settlement (Chatfield & Reddick, 2019). 
The market structure in which an organization operates, as well as the nature of the firm itself may also influence 
the adoption of Blockchain (Zhang, 2018). Blockchain adoption has been considered more in industries with low 
adoption costs, such as cryptocurrencies and digital contents, as well as those with high costs of uncertainty, for 
example food, pharmaceutical and luxury goods. In these industries, new entrants and incumbents are more likely 
to develop their own Blockchain solutions. Conversely, industries such as high-tech, logistics, banking and insur-
ance, which have high adoption costs and high product differentiation are likely to develop Blockchain as a Service 
platforms to serve others (Zhang, 2018). 
Blockchain-based systems need to be proven as a resilient decentralized system with little to no chance of down 
time to increase wide scale adoption within financial organizations (Holotiuk et al, 2018). Indeed, for blockchain 
systems to reach widespread adoption within Financial Services, the necessary industry standards need to be de-
veloped (Holotiuk, F., F. Pisani, and J. Moormann, 2018, b; Wyman, 2016; Glaser & Bezzenberger, 2015). On 
one hand, government agencies potentially slow down the dissemination of blockchain systems by introducing 
new laws and regulation that tightly monitor the industry for compliance. On the other, increased regulation would 
result in a positive effect on the adoption of blockchain systems (Baker and Werbach, 2019; Peters, Panayi, & 
Chapelle, 2015; Crosby et al., 2016). Adoption decisions are further complicated with organisations needing to 
make a decision regarding which Blockchain platform to choose, with Ethereum, Hyperledger Hyperchain being 
just a few of the options available (Pongnumkul et al., 2017).  
Scaling blockchain systems also presents a challenge for financial service players as it is very important that block-
chain systems can scale efficiently as the number of transactions increase (Holotiuk et al., 2018 ; Crosby et al., 
2016; Croman et al., 2016). As a blockchain system increases in size this may lead to the number of users on the 
network being able to verify new transactions to decrease, as they are unable to match the growth of the blockchain 
with the necessary resources required (Walsh et al., 2016). This may result in the system becoming more central-
ized and more at risk to a central point of failure or malicious attacks (Guo, 2020; Croman et al., 2016; Walsh et 
al., 2016).  
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As Blockchain technology has developed, smart contracts have become much more relevant – but also a potential 
inhibitor to their adoption. Smarts contracts are similar to normal contracts with the exception that they are digital; 
they are code stored inside the blockchain which execute when specific conditions arise (Macrinici, Cartofeanu, 
& Gao, 2018). The immutable nature of Smart Contract’s is a barrier to their adoption in uncertain and 
multi-contextual environments as they do not have a mechanism to handle the varying requirements of 
different stakeholders (Gonzalez Rivas, Tsyganova, & Mik, 2018). Smart contracts offer many different 
benefits by offering customisation to applications using blockchain. There are a wide variety of uses for these 
smart contracts including: 
 Security within 5G mobile networks (Nguyen, Pathirana, Ding, & Seneviratne, 2020) 
 Managing access to IOT devices (Khan & Salah, 2018) 
 Monetising the vale of IOT data (Suliman, Husain, Anououf, Alblooshi, & Salah, 2019) 
 Supply chain in agriculture (Mirabelli & Solina, 2020) 
These benefits should assist in their adoption, but smart contracts are not without problems (Macrinici et al., 2018). 
The relative infancy of the use of smart contracts, and the wide variety of programming languages (Singh, Parizi, 
Qi, Raymond, & Dehghantanhad, 2020), can lead to vulnerabilities which have the potential to lead to financial 
loss (Singh et al., 2020). 
When smart contracts rely on external information then they use trusted Oracles, which provide data to the smart 
contracts. Example of this are seen in: 
 the delivery of parcels with sensors attached to ensure that the parcel is delivered correctly and to the 
correct standard (Muller & Garzon, 2019) 
 a decentralised access control system for data from IOT devices (Albreiki, Alqassem, Salah, Rehman, & 
Svetinovic, 2019) 
 increasing the trustworthiness of decision making in Artificial Intelligence (Salah, Habib Ur Rehman, 
Nizamuddin, & Al-Fuqaha, 2019) 
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There are concerns though that these Oracles can become a single point-of-failures for the systems that rely on 
them, with the possibility of the Oracle being manipulated by a third party (Adler, Berryhill, Poulos, Veira, & 
Kastania, 2018), attacks which impact on their security (Albreiki et al., 2019; Dong & Boutaba, 2020), or just 
provide incorrect information (Murray, Kuban, Josefy, & Anderson, 2019). This is known as the “Oracle Problem” 
and, although researchers have suggested solutions (Singh et al., 2020), any doubts raised could impact on the 
potential adoption of blockchain. 
The adoption of smart contracts by an organisation has also been shown to be influenced by their relational nature, 
a firm adopting smart contracts will bear up-front costs. These costs will only be justified if their partners are also 
willing to adopt, otherwise the benefits will be too small to justify the cost (Halaburda, Levina, & Semi, 2019). 
Additionally, unless the long-term existence of smart contracts is assured, the appeal of smart contracts will only 
apply to short term contracts, limiting the potential of long term adoption (Halaburda et al., 2019). 
While these technical challenges exist for blockchain, there is an argument that there is too much of a focus on the 
technology behind the adoption of blockchain and not enough on the managers and people involved (F Holotiuk 
& J Moormann, 2018). 
2.2 Resistance Literature 
This paper contributes to understanding how managers within organizations assess change in relation to a new 
technology, in this case blockchain, and identifying the causes for resisting the technology. Resistance refers to 
forces that prevent new behaviours from taking hold in seemingly functional systems (Keen, 1981; Gibson, 2003; 
Jasperson, Carter, & Zmud, 2005). Understanding resistance is important for IS researchers looking to explain the 
non-adoption of new innovations (Jiang, Muhanna, & Klein, 2000). Blockchain technologies are nascent in large 
multi-national organizations. Hence, by understanding the factors influencing resistance towards it, this paper 
hopes to provide future research a foundation to more effectively introduce blockchain systems in years to come. 
Resistance in block chain literature is usually mentioned with regard to blockchain technology’s ability to resist 
tampering to the data in the block structure (cf. Conoscenti, Vetro, & De Martin, 2017; Muzammal & Qu, 2019) 
or how the blockchain’s censorship-resistance ensures that information can’t be altered or censored (cf. Biswas & 
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Muthukkumarasamy, 2016). Resistance, though, is more than a technical capability, it also refers to a refusal or 
unwillingness by individuals and organisations to use blockchain. Blockchain technology will force managers in 
the financial sector to reassess and change their management processes (Collomb & Sok, 2016). Beck and Muller-
Bloch (2017) describe how resistance to blockchain in existing financial organisations needs to be overcome for 
the business benefits to be realised.  
Studies show that resistance is a key challenge for the implementation of large technology projects (Kim & 
Kankanhalli, 2009). Resistance is particularly significant in such large technology implementations due to the 
diverse changes in social and technical systems (Gibson, 2003; Kim & Kankanhalli, 2009). While losses and 
threats have been noted as causes of user resistance, there are gaps in understanding the psychological and decision 
making mechanisms underlying resistance to a new technology system (Kim & Kankanhalli, 2009). Kim and 
Kankanhalli (2009) developed a model to explain resistance prior to a new system implementation by utilising the 
technology acceptance and resistance model literature.  
The status quo bias theory (Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988) explains that individuals can become resistant to 
adopting a new technology because of their bias or preference to stay with their current technology. Status quo 
bias involves assessing the relative costs and benefits of switching to a new technology over their current situation 
and the cost incurred when adopting the new technology (Kim & Kankanhalli, 2009).  
The model of resistance developed by Kim and Kankanhalli (2009) is selected to act as a theoretical foundation 
for this study for two reasons. Firstly, the individual-based view of resistance resonates with this study’s focus on 
managers within Financial Services. Secondly, the rational view of resistance presented by Kim and Kankanhalli 
assumes that an individual’s resistance is, at least partially, concerned with the accomplishment of specific goals 
(Gleasure, 2015).  
3. Material and methods 
In order to enhance our understanding of manager resistance to blockchain-based systems, a mixed-method ap-
proach is required (Creswell & Clark, 2007). This approach is sequential and quantitative-dominant (Johnson et 
al., 2007). Such an approach will (i) facilitate refinement of the conceptual model and the creation of additional 
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hypotheses via interviews with Financial Services professionals (ii) test the hypotheses via a survey and (iii) es-
tablish a model of manager resistance to blockchain-based systems. The participants of both the qualitative and 
quantitative components of this research were asked questions in relation to the perceived benefits and costs of 
changing some of their current systems to blockchain-based systems. 
3.1 Preliminary Qualitative Study  
Preliminary qualitative analysis focused on the attitudes of senior managers in Financial Service towards migrating 
from existing systems to blockchain-based alternatives to understand the factors which impact upon the operational 
adoption of Blockchain-based systems within the Financial Services sector. The aim of the preliminary qualitative 
analysis was to identify additional constructs and relationships of organizational managers/influencers attitudes 
towards the adoption of blockchain. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with five senior Financial Services 
managers from three organisations in the financial services industry (table 1)for a total of seven hours to gauge 
their individual experience and perceptions of blockchain-based systems.These interviewees were selected as their 
organisations were heavily involved in exploring Blockchain technologies within the financial services industry 
and their seniority meant that they were pivotal to the conversations taking place within their respective organisa-
tions.  
Position Length 
Chief Data Scientist 1.5 hrs 
Chief Technology Architect 1.5 hrs 
Managing Director 1 hr 
Head of Consultancy Services Group 2 hrs 
Senior Vice President 1 hr 
Table 1: Interviewee Position 
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Thematic analysis (Braun & Clark, 2006) was used to analyze data. The goal of thematic analysis is to identify 
key themes i.e. emerging patterns that are important and interesting. Open, axial and selective coding (Strauss and 
Corbin, 1990) were the coding methods used to analyse the transcribed interview transcripts. 
The first theme identified was that the perceived ability to simplify infrastructure impacts resistance to blockchain-
based systems. This theme is multifaceted, as on one hand it is perceived that blockchain-based systems could 
simplify your current infrastructure, as the Chief Data Scientist mentioned “(blockchain) could be used as a single 
source of truth”. While a blockchain provides a mechanism for trusted immutable transactions, the Chief Technol-
ogy Architect spoke of how it also provides organizations with a “better way to track and manage data … there is 
a data trail from inception and complete tracking” on a blockchain. As some blockchain-based systems offer smart 
contract capabilities, there is the potential to automate certain business processes. The Chief Data Scientist de-
scribed this as an “opportunity for (organizations) to offer new services”. All of these factors were grouped together 
as simplicity of infrastructure, describing some of the benefits a blockchain can provide. 
The second theme was the perceived requirement for additional infrastructure to support a blockchain-based sys-
tem. There was a perception of a large knowledge gap between organizations and their understanding of blockchain 
technologies. Interviewees felt that right now there are far too few developers with the necessary blockchain edu-
cation and experience. A significant point mentioned by the Senior Vice President was “not only is there an im-
portance to educating the business but also to educate the public … by educating the right people at the right time, 
so not to scare or overwhelm employees and the public with a new technology”. The Head of the Consulting 
Services Group mentioned the importance of educating the regulator, “The issue with the regulators is that their 
primary objective is to regulate not innovate”. There also needs to be an increase in investment into the necessary 
hardware and software in order to create and support blockchain-based systems. It takes time and resources from 
organizations to provide the necessary infrastructure for blockchain-based systems, which is bound in this study 
as perceived need for new infrastructure. 
The third emerging theme was the importance of the organizations environment as a whole. There is a need for a 
change in culture as Blockchain-based systems demand a change in thinking. The Chief Technology Architect said 
“moving from stable legacy systems to new blockchain-based systems would require a shift in understanding how 
you could do business”. Similar concerns were directed towards the mindset of regulators, who are perceived to 
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be influential actors by organizations. Having the correct standards and regulations in place is therefore key to the 
adoption of Blockchain-based systems in financial organizations. Regulation and compliance is a big cost for 
financial organizations, the Head of the Consultancy Services Group felt “if this cost could be minimized by the 
use of a blockchain”, this would really drive down resistance to said systems. A point reiterated in the interviews 
is that banks are traditionally restricted when it comes to innovative technologies like blockchain, because of 
compliance and risk considerations. As a means to overcome this restriction, the Managing Director  mentioned 
how their organization “are creating different partnerships with parties who have much more freedom to work with 
disruptive technology”. This is perceived to mean that traditional financial service organizations are evolving to 
be more open to new partnerships with emerging Fintechs. Traditionally a banking environment is a closed and 
protected environment, hence opting to join a consortium or working with different partnerships represents signif-
icant departure from traditional practices. These emerging factors were grouped into the environmental support 
construct. 
3.2 Developing a conceptual model 
The preliminary qualitative study established the importance of having the correct blockchain infrastructure and 
environment in place. Towards developing an understanding of potential resistance to blockchain adoption, the 
researchers leverage these emerging themes from the qualitative data alongside Kim and Kankanhallis’ established 
theoretical model towards developing a Blockchain Resistance model and associated hypotheses for testing (Figure 
1). Table 2 defines the Blockchain Resistance Models constructs.  
Construct Definition 
Individual resistance The extent to which an individual is resistant to a blockchain implementation 
Perceived value The perceived benefits an individual will enjoy relative to the cost of implementing 
a new blockchain system 
Perceived switching 
costs  
The adverse effects an individual would experience when switching from the status 
quo to a blockchain technology 
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Perceived need for new 
infrastructure 
Additional infrastructure required to support blockchain technologies in an organi-
zation in terms of hardware, software, new applications and personnel with block-
chain knowledge and experience 
Perceived switching 
benefits  




The benefits following switching from the status quo to a blockchain, including a 
reduction of infrastructure in terms of automated business process via smart con-
tracts and a simplified ecosystem using a single distributed ledger 
Self-efficacy for change The confidence an individual has in their ability to adapt to a new way of working 
with a blockchain 
Organizational support The level of support within an organization in relation to blockchain technologies 
Environmental  support The level of support shown by both regulatory bodies an organisation which can be 
a deciding factor when changing from the status quo to a blockchain-based system 
Table 2. Model Constructs 
Kim and Kankanhalli (2009) describe perceived value as the benefits relative to cost that a user may attain from 
switching from the status quo to a new blockchain system. Gleasure (2015) described perceived value as an indi-
vidual’s perception of the total benefits of adopting a new technology which is influenced by the switching benefits 
and switching costs of the new technology. If a manager’s perceived value of blockchain technology is low, they 
are likely to have a greater resistance to change, whereas if the perceived value is high, managers will have a lower 
resistance to a blockchain implementation.  
H1. Perceived value of blockchain has a negative effect on manager resistance to blockchain 
Two constructs emerge which influence the perceived value of blockchain technologies. The first construct is 
perceived switching costs of blockchain, which indicates the adverse effects associated with switching from the 
status quo to a new blockchain system (Chen & Hitt, 2002). This includes the unexpected hassle and complex 
procedures of moving to a new implementation and the difficulty for employees to understand the new system 
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(Jones, Mothersbaugh, & Beatty, 2000). The factors mentioned above are perhaps important determinants of a 
manager increasing their resistance to using a blockchain system. 
H2. Perceived switching costs of blockchain has a positive effect on manager resistance 
Perceived switching costs not only has a direct effect on user resistance but also could have an indirect effect on 
resistance through perceived value. Higher switching costs would result in a decrease of benefits perceived by a 
manager; they may think it is not worthwhile changing from the status quo to a new blockchain-based system (Kim 
& Kankanhalli, 2009). 
H3. Perceived switching costs have a negative effect on perceived value 
Perceived need for new infrastructure appeared as an additional construct, which has an effect on the perceived 
switching cost and perceived value of a blockchain. This relates to the additional infrastructure required to imple-
ment and maintain a blockchain, including necessary hardware and software, development and maintenance of 
new blockchain specific applications and the necessary personnel with blockchain experience and knowledge 
(Back et al., 2014; Brenig, Schwarz & Rückeshäuser, 2016; Holotiuk, Pisani & Moormann, 2017). As the need for 
additional infrastructure rises, this will have a positive effect on perceived switching costs and perceived value as 
managers will conclude a new blockchain system will be more expensive than the status quo. 
H4. Perceived need for new infrastructure will have a positive effect on perceived switching 
costs of blockchain 
H5. Perceived need for new infrastructure will have a positive effect on perceived value of 
blockchain 
The perceived switching benefits of blockchain refers to the value created if an organization switches from the 
status quo to a new blockchain technology (Chen & Hitt, 2002; Kim & Kankanhalli, 2009). Perceived benefits 
reflect an individual’s belief that the use of a blockchain-based system, will result in both direct and indirect pos-
itive outcomes. Several blockchain benefits on offer for an organization include increased transparency, lower 
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transaction costs, immutable and amend only records and disintermediation (Peters & Panayi, 2015; Abramova & 
Böhme, 2016). Higher perceived switching benefits would increase the perceived value of changing to a block-
chain. 
H6. Perceived switching benefits of blockchain will have a positive effect on perceived value. 
Simplicity of infrastructure was identified as a contributor to the perceived value and perceived switching bene-
fits of a blockchain-based system. This relates to the advantages a blockchain can provide to organizations. Once 
a blockchain system has been deployed, some of the resulting benefits include less time to complete transactions 
and reduced transaction fees (Wörner et al., 2016; Abramova & Böhme, 2016; Fabian & Sander, 2016). By the 
use of smart contracts, a blockchain can help automate certain business processes, which could make certain 
tasks much easier for users (Peters & Panayi, 2015; Beck et al., 2016). A blockchain can also provide increased 
transparency and immutability of data, allowing for new lenses for audits and regulatory requirements (Walsh et 
al., 2016; Wörner et al., 2016). As the number of blockchain advantages increases, this will have a positive effect 
on perceived switching benefits and perceived value as users will know what results can be achieved from a 
blockchain. 
H7. Simplicity of infrastructure will have a positive effect on perceived switching benefits 
 
H8. Simplicity of infrastructure will have a positive effect on perceived value  
Self-efficacy for change described by Bandura (1997), as a user’s confidence in their ability to adapt to a new 
way of working with a new system. Individuals who have a high level of self-efficacy will face new challenges 
with confidence, whereas those with low levels of self-efficacy will feel discouraged and more likely to resist the 
change to a new blockchain, therefore resulting in resisting the change to a blockchain. 
H9. Self-efficacy for change has a negative effect on manager resistance to blockchain 
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Self-efficacy for change can also affect perceived switching costs of blockchain. If individuals have high levels of 
self-efficacy, they will experience less uncertainty regarding the change to a new blockchain. They may feel con-
fident in learning new skills and feel prepared to use the new technology (Bandura, 1997). This will result in 
individuals having a lower perception of switching costs as they have self-belief that they will be capable of work-
ing with a blockchain. 
H10. Self-efficacy for change has a negative effect on perceived switching costs 
Organizational support for change to a new blockchain system is defined as the backing provided by an organiza-
tion to make adapting to a blockchain technology easier. Changing from the status quo requires guidance and 
direction from management to make facilitating the change easier for employees (Kim & Kankanhalli, 2009). In 
the context of this study, organizations need to understand the strategic importance of implementing a blockchain 
but also that senior management is supportive of the development of new systems by providing learning resources 
for employees (Plansky et al., 2016). As the level of organization’s support for blockchain technologies increases, 
this will result in employees feeling supported and if clear leadership is shown by senior management, managers 
will be less resistant to the implementation of a blockchain. An additional hypothesis to Kim and Kankanhalli’s 
original model is that organizational support may also indirectly, through self-efficacy, have an effect on manager 
resistance. This is understood as the more support an organization shows, the more managers will feel capable of 
switching to a Blockchain-based system. 
 
H11. Organizational support for change has a negative effect on manager resistance 
H12. Organizational support for change has a positive effect on self-efficacy 
Environmental support is an additional construct identified from the qualitative analysis. Systems can be well 
established in organizations and deciding to move to a new implementation can require a fundamentally different 
way of thinking. The key themes that appeared in relation to this construct is that a huge paradigm shift is required 
to implement a blockchain, as this is a new way of doing business. Regulatory support and governmental opinion 
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is considered high when deciding to implement a new technology (Glaser & Bezzenberger, 2015; Abramova & 
Böhme, 2016). If the appropriate regulations and standards are in place and the regulator shows support towards 
blockchain technology, this would directly drive down manager resistance and also indirectly through perceived 
value. 
H13. Environmental support has a negative effect on manager resistance of blockchain 
H14. Environmental support has a negative effect on perceived value of blockchain 
 
Figure 1. Blockchain Resistance Model 
3.3  Quantitatively Testing the Model 
Towards operationalizing the model in Figure 1 and testing the hypotheses, an online survey instrument was de-
veloped. The survey questionnaire was constructed using the indicators adopted from the literature to develop 
survey questions for the quantitative data-collection phase. The construct indicators along with their associated 
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survey statements are depicted in Table 3. Following the generation of an initial iteration of the instrument as per 
Hair et al. (2006), the authors pre-tested the instrument with academic and industry “experts” in order to assess 
the semantic content of each construct. The authors retained those items that best fitted and reflected the definitions 
of the constructs, a process that facilitated the refinement and streamlining of the items included in this survey.  
Data was gathered over a four-month period from November 2016 to February 2017 from Financial Services 
organizations. The survey was distributed via email (an anonymous URL link) to Financial Services managers. 
The survey was distributed to three different Financial Services organizations, specifically State Street, Fexco and 
Dell Financial Services. These three organizations were purposely selected as they met the criteria of having im-
plemented, or being at an advanced stage of implementing, a Blockchain based system. Invitations were sent to 
400 managers in these three organizations. This facilitated testing the legitimacy, explanatory power, and statistical 
generalizability of the proposed model (Marshall & Rossman, 1989; Yin, 1994, Venkatesh et al., 2013) and col-
lecting data from managers in three organisations helped ensure representativeness.  
Due to the sample size the author employed the Partial Least Square [PLS] (Structural Equation Modelling 
[SEM]) approach for data analysis purposes, which uses component-based estimations and allows simultaneous 
examination of two models, the measurement (outer) model and structural (inner) model. The outer model por-
trays the relationship between a construct and its associated indicators whereas the inner model identifies rela-
tionships between constructs (Tenenhaus et al., 2005; Diamantopoulos & Siguaw, 2006). SmartPLS (version 
3.2.6) was utilized to generate the statistical outputs associated with the survey data. 
 
Construct  Indicators Survey Statements Reference 
Individual 
resistance 
UR ur1 I would oppose changing some of the systems I cur-
rently use for blockchain-based systems 
Kim & 
Kankanhalli 
(2009) ur2 I do not agree with changing some of the systems I 
currently use for blockchain-based systems 
ur3 I would not cooperate with changing some of the sys-
tems I currently use for blockchain-based systems 
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ur4 I would not comply with changing some of the sys-
tems I currently use for blockchain-based systems 
Perceived  
value 
PV pv1 Considering the time and effort that I have to spend 
executing tasks using current practices, changing some 
of the systems I currently use for blockchain-based 









removed Considering the loss that I will incur, changing some 
of the systems I currently use for blockchain-based 
systems is good value 
pv3 Considering the hassle that I will have to experience, 
changing some of the systems I currently use for 
blockchain-based systems will be beneficial to me 
Perceived switch-
ing benefits of 
blockchain 
PB pb1 Changing some of the systems I currently use for 
blockchain-based systems would enhance my effec-





pb2 Changing some of the systems I currently use for 
blockchain-based systems would enable me to accom-
plish relevant tasks more quickly than working in the 
current way 
removed Changing some of the systems I currently use for 
blockchain-based systems would increase my produc-
tivity in comparison to working in the current way 
removed Changing some of the systems I currently use for 
blockchain-based systems would improve the quality 









SI si1 Using a blockchain system would result in reduced 
running costs 
 
removed Using a blockchain system would allow me to auto-
mate business processes 
si3 Using a blockchain system would make the infrastruc-
ture simpler for me to use 
si4 Using a blockchain system would provide me with 
better ability to track and manage data 
Perceived switch-
ing costs of 
blockchain 
PC pc1 It would take a lot of time and effort to switch the sys-
tems I currently use for blockchain-based systems 
Kim & 
Kankanhalli 
(2009) pc2 Switching the systems I currently use for blockchain-
based systems could result in unexpected hassles 
pc3 I have already put a lot of time and effort into master-
ing the systems I use today 
 removed I would lose a lot of my work if I were to switch the 




PI removed An increase in the amount of hardware and software 
would be required to support new blockchain-based 
systems 
 
removed An increased number of blockchain specific applica-
tions needs to be created 
pi3 There would be a demand for an increased number of 
personnel required to manage new blockchain applica-
tions 
pi4 My organization would need to increase the number of 
personnel with blockchain knowledge and experience 
 
 





SE se1 Based on my own knowledge, skills and abilities, 
changing the systems I currently use for blockchain-




se2 I would be able to change the system I currently use 
for blockchain-based systems without the help of oth-
ers 
se3 I would be able to change the systems I currently use 




OS os1 I feel my organization would provide me with guid-





os2 I feel management would provide the necessary help 
and resources to enable me to change the systems I 
currently use for blockchain-based systems 
os3 I feel I would be given the necessary support and as-
sistance by the company to change the systems I cur-
rently use for blockchain-based systems 
Environmental 
Support 




es2 Were my organization to adopt and implement block-
chain-based systems the influence from regulatory 
bodies would be significant factor 
es3 Using blockchain-based systems would call for a fun-
damentally different way of thinking 









4. Quantitative Results 
This section describes the findings from the quantitative components of our mixed methods research. 
 
4.1 Respondent profiles 
As outlined earlier, the respondents were Financial Services professionals, holding a minimum rank of manager. 
The survey was completely anonymous and did not ask for any sensitive information. The respondents were asked 
to identify the department/discipline they belonged to (i.e. business or IT function) and their level of blockchain 
knowledge. The online survey had 123 responses, resulting in 90 complete and valid responses. 90 responses is 
sufficient to get reliable PLS results. It satisfies an accepted “10 times” rule of thumb, that states the minimum 
sample size as 10 times the most complex relationships within the research model (Chin, 1998). 
 
4.2 Hypothesis and model testing 
The reliability of items was evaluated by examining the Composite Reliability (CR), which is typically superior 
to Cronbach’s Alpha for PLS modelling studies (Gefen & Straub, 2005). Table 4 shows that the CR of each con-
struct is greater than 0.7, which is the accepted threshold for construct reliability (Bagozzi & Yi, 1988). Average 
Variance Extracted (AVE) was used to test convergent validity (Table 4), for which all constructs scored above 
the accepted threshold of 0.6 (Chin, 1998). Discriminant validity was assessed following the Fornell and Larcker 
(1981) approach whereby the square root of the AVE of each latent variable must be greater than correlations 








Construct Composite Reliability (CR) Average Variance Extracted (AVE) 
Perceived need for new        infrastruc-
ture (PI) 
0.844 0.732 
Environmental support (ES) 0.781 0.641 
Organisational support for change 
(OS) 
0.951 0.867 
Perceived switching benefits (PB) 0.916 0.846 
Perceived switching costs (PS) 0.769 0.525 
Perceived value of blockchain (PV) 0.948 0.901 
Self-efficacy for change (SE) 0.923 0.801 
Simplicity of infrastructure (SI) 0.879 0.708 
Individual resistance to blockchain 
(UR) 
0.920 0.743 
Table 4. Internal Consistency Reliability Test 
 
PI ES OS PB PC PV SE SI UR 
PI 0.856 
        
ES 0.372 0.801 
       
OS 0.194 0.141 0.931 
      
PB 0.059 0.354 0.221 0.920 
     
PC 0.581 0.409 0.146 0.050 0.725 
    
PV 0.112 0.181 0.304 0.602 -0.002 0.949 
   
SE 0.023 0.016 0.308 0.353 0.046 0.358 0.895 
  
SI 0.111 0.414 0.293 0.707 -0.026 0.683 0.310 0.841 
 
UR -0.278 -0.312 -0.384 -0.291 -0.208 -0.406 -0.135 -0.421 0.862 
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Table 5. Fornell-Larcker criterion analysis for checking discriminant validity 
The authors also tested discriminant validity by examining the cross-loadings of items across constructs. Table 6 
shows that each item loads at 0.707 or higher on the target construct, with no items coming within 0.2 of the items 
loading on separate constructs (Bagozzi & Yi, 1988; Gefen & Straub, 2005). These results suggest each of the 
indicators retained in the final theoretical model are reliable and valid. 
 
 
PI ES OS PB PC PV SE SI UR 
pi3 0.774 0.226 0.147 0.062 0.353 0.034 0.067 0.068 -0.1 
pi4 0.931 0.382 0.182 0.045 0.596 0.135 -0.007 0.114 -0.326 
es2 0.144 0.798 0.223 0.359 0.239 0.185 0.061 0.439 -0.225 
es3 0.45 0.803 0.004 0.209 0.416 0.105 -0.035 0.226 -0.275 
os1 0.159 0.166 0.937 0.266 0.118 0.364 0.278 0.347 -0.407 
os2 0.21 0.064 0.913 0.132 0.17 0.192 0.267 0.194 -0.325 
os3 0.176 0.155 0.942 0.209 0.123 0.28 0.316 0.265 -0.335 
pb3 0.01 0.273 0.167 0.910 -0.006 0.538 0.245 0.596 -0.22 
pb4 0.093 0.373 0.236 0.929 0.093 0.568 0.395 0.7 -0.311 
pc1 0.408 0.381 0.015 0.007 0.707 0.022 -0.157 0.042 -0.14 
pc2 0.333 0.25 0.017 -0.173 0.733 -0.242 -0.195 -0.201 -0.038 
pc3 0.49 0.256 0.241 0.2 0.734 0.143 0.179 0.144 -0.235 
pv1 0.03 0.16 0.195 0.629 -0.072 0.952 0.355 0.688 -0.35 
pv3 0.188 0.183 0.387 0.511 0.079 0.946 0.325 0.605 -0.422 
se1 0.038 0.054 0.326 0.303 0.012 0.360 0.918 0.324 -0.087 
se2 -0.086 0.046 0.115 0.324 -0.089 0.214 0.810 0.215 -0.118 
se3 0.055 -0.036 0.315 0.336 -0.07 0.347 0.951 0.275 -0.158 
si1 0.192 0.414 0.28 0.669 0.1 0.593 0.342 0.841 -0.444 
si3 0.01 0.274 0.215 0.516 -0.106 0.527 0.208 0.823 -0.266 
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si4 0.062 0.345 0.239 0.587 0.052 0.597 0.222 0.859 -0.338 
us1 -0.254 -0.282 -0.288 -0.189 -0.1 -0.329 -0.198 -0.356 0.878 
us2 -0.188 -0.217 -0.298 -0.352 -0.062 -0.318 -0.261 -0.401 0.797 
us3 -0.269 -0.324 -0.357 -0.246 -0.309 -0.358 0.056 -0.305 0.848 
us4 -0.24 -0.241 -0.367 -0.234 -0.198 -0.385 -0.127 -0.407 0.921 
Table 6. Cross Loadings 
Following the validation of the outer model, the inner model was tested via bootstrapping (Davison & Hinkley, 
1997; Hair et al., 2014). Significant relationships were observed between simplicity of infrastructure and perceived 
value of blockchain, simplicity of infrastructure and perceived switching benefits of blockchain, perceived need 
for new infrastructure and perceived switching costs of blockchain and organisational support for change and 











Perceived need for new infrastructure ->  Per-
ceived switching costs of blockchain *** 
0.582 0.572 0.091 6.396 <.001 
Perceived need for new infrastructure ->   Per-
ceived value of blockchain 
0.112 0.11 0.075 1.493 0.136 
Environmental support -> Perceived value of 
blockchain* 
-0.178 -0.154 0.089 1.994 0.047 
Environmental support -> Individual resistance to 
blockchain 
-0.182 -0.179 0.117 1.557 0.121 
Organisational support for change ->     Self-effi-
cacy for change *** 
0.308 0.313 0.095 3.248 <.001 
Organisational support for change ->      Individual 
resistance to blockchain ** 
-0.268 -0.251 0.104 2.59 0.01 
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Perceived switching benefits of blockchain   -> 
Perceived value of blockchain * 
0.266 0.249 0.107 2.483 0.014 
Perceived switching costs of blockchain -> Per-
ceived value of blockchain 
-0.019 -0.025 0.089 0.21 0.834 
Perceived switching costs of blockchain -> Indi-
vidual resistance to blockchain 
-0.092 -0.106 0.107 0.857 0.392 
Perceived value of blockchain ->         Individual 
resistance to blockchain * 
-0.312 -0.316 0.141 2.213 0.028 
Self-efficacy for change -> Perceived switching 
costs of blockchain 
-0.059 -0.06 0.13 0.458 0.647 
Self-efficacy for change -> Individual resistance to 
blockchain 
0.058 0.036 0.109 0.532 0.595 
Simplicity of infrastructure ->             Perceived 
switching benefits of blockchain *** 
0.707 0.707 0.074 9.573 <.001 
Simplicity of infrastructure -> Perceived value of 
blockchain *** 
0.556 0.557 0.099 5.628 <.001 
Table 7. Results of bootstrapping inner model 
Table 8 demonstrates that 8 of the 14 research hypotheses were supported by the findings of our model estimation 
and data analysis in this study. 
Hypotheses Outcome Values 
H1. Perceived value of blockchain has a negative effect on individual resistance to 
blockchain 
Supported -0.312 
H2. Perceived switching costs of blockchain has a positive effect on manager re-
sistance 
(ns) - 
H3. Perceived switching costs have a negative effect on perceived value (ns) - 
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H4. Perceived need for new infrastructure will have a positive effect on perceived 
switching costs of blockchain 
Supported 0.582 
H5. Perceived need for new infrastructure will have a positive effect on perceived 
value of blockchain 
(ns) - 
H6. Perceived switching benefits of blockchain will have a positive effect on per-
ceived value 
Supported 0.266 
H7. Simplicity of infrastructure will have a positive effect on perceived switching 
benefits 
Supported 0.707 
H8. Simplicity of infrastructure will have a positive effect on perceived value Supported 0.556 
H9. Self-efficacy for change has a negative effect on manager resistance to block-
chain 
(ns) - 
H10. Self-efficacy for change has a negative effect on perceived switching costs (ns) - 
H11. Organizational support for change has a negative effect on manager resistance Supported -0.268 
H12. Organizational support for change has a positive effect on self-efficacy Supported 0.308 
H13. Environmental support has a negative effect on manager resistance of block-
chain 
(ns) - 
H14. Environmental support has a negative effect on perceived value of blockchain Supported -0.178 
Table 8. Hypothesis  
PLS path modelling suggests the overall level of explained variance of the dependent construct Resistance to 
Blockchain is 29.8% (see Figure 2). Resistance was explained at the high end of the weak level consistent with 
Chin’s (1998) criteria (i.e. 0.19 – 0.33). The results indicated that perceived value (H1), self-efficacy (H9) organ-
isational support (H11) and environmental support (H13) had significant effects on resistance, explaining 29.8% 
of its variance. Switching costs (H3), perceived need for new infrastructure (H5), switching benefits (H6) and 
simplicity of infrastructure (H8) had a significant effect on perceived value, explaining 52% of its variance. How-
ever, switching benefits (H6) and simplicity of infrastructure (H8) have a much higher weighting on perceived 
value compared to switching costs (H3) and perceived need for new infrastructure (H5). Perceived need for new 
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infrastructure had a significant impact (H4) on switching costs and simplicity of infrastructure (H7) affected 
switching benefits, respectively explaining 58.2% and 70.7% of its variance.  
 
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05 (Based on t(2991), two-tailed test).  
Figure 2. PLS Algorithm of Measurement and Structural Models 
5. Discussion 
Blockchain-based systems provide a multitude of benefits with decentralization at the core. In a distributed decen-
tralized system, the requirement for a central authority to control the system can become obsolete. This can result 
in benefits such as faster transaction speeds compared to other alternatives and transaction irreversibility (Zohar, 
 
1 The t-test for each path coefficient was conducted with 299 degrees of freedom, where is a number of subsample repetitions in bootstrapping 
procedure. 300 repetitions were chosen resulting 299 is degrees of freedom.     
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2015; Abramova & Böhme, 2016). Blockchain-based systems also have the potential to create a simpler infra-
structure and bypass the role of traditional financial intermediaries (Gao, Clark & Lindqvist, 2015; Yee, 2014). 
This study highlights the importance of this potential for a simplification of infrastructure in determining manager 
resistance. This simplicity reduces manager resistance indirectly through both switching benefits and perceived 
value of blockchain.  
A surprising finding from this study is that perceived switching costs didn’t appear to impact manager resistance 
to blockchain-based systems (H2). This contradicts the general model proposed by Kim and Kankanhalli. More 
fundamentally, it appears to jar with the underlying theory of reasoned action and planned behaviour at the heart 
of that model, as it suggests that costs are not being factored into decision-making at an individual-level. The 
researchers interpret this as a reflection of the confidence many people have in Blockchain-based systems, i.e. they 
believe the benefits will outweigh the costs, hence are presently only interested in figuring out what those benefits 
may be. An alternative may be that managers are simply not aware of the costs, meaning they are omitting them 
unknowingly. However, this alternative explanation is challenged by the observation that the perceived need for 
new infrastructure had a significant effect on perceived switching costs (H4). This finding extends previous re-
search suggesting there is a knowledge gap in relation to blockchain and a need for more blockchain education 
(Kursh & Gold, 2016; Holotiuk, Pisani & Moormann, 2017).  
Analysis also showed that environmental support decreases manager resistance both directly and indirectly through 
its effect on perceived value. In particular, this study highlights the importance of the regulator - a finding con-
sistent with prior literature (Bohr & Bashir, 2014; Grant & Hogan, 2015; Grinberg, 2011; Reid & Harrigan, 2011). 
There is no evidence of a universal standard or regulation in place regarding the storage and transmission of data 
in blockchain-based systems. This absence of said standards and regulatory backing creates a perceived risk asso-
ciated with blockchain-based systems that undermines adoption (Abramova & Böhme, 2016). Numerous financial 
organizations and regulators are currently coming together to explore blockchain standards towards potentially 
improving adoption levels (Brenig, Schwarz & Rückeshäuser, 2016), e.g. the European Central Bank, New York 
State Department of Financial Services, and the Bank of England, to name a few . Yet, the outcome of such efforts 
remains uncertain.  
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Another surprising finding was that self-efficacy (H10) was not found to decrease resistance. Rather, it actually 
seemed to have a small positive effect, explaining 5.8% of its variance. The general model proposed by Kim and 
Kankanhalli’s (2009) suggested the impact of self-efficacy on resistance may be trivial or non-existent. However, 
the idea that it could actually increase resistance is curious. The most compelling explanation is that the introduc-
tion of blockchain-based systems is not seen as something within the capabilities of most individuals. Hence, those 
individuals with low self-efficacy do not see themselves as having the expertise to resist a blockchain-based sys-
tem, assuming instead they will adopt it by default. Alternatively, those with more specialised knowledge are more 
likely to be considered and reflective in their adoption of specific systems, thereby more likely to become resistant.  
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper presents one of the few published studies looking at individual’s perceptions of blockchain-based sys-
tems and one of the first focusing on financial services professionals’ perspectives on the adoption of Blockchain 
based systems in mainstream financial services. Most existing studies look specifically at the Bitcoin community 
(Bohr & Bashir, 2014), country specific adoption of Bitcoin (Kumpajaya & Dhewanto, 2015) and more recently 
the perceived benefit and risk of Bitcoin (Abramova & Böhme, 2016). This study took a deliberately abstract view 
of blockchain to represent the larger and more domain-spanning implications of this radically new technological 
paradigm. A study by Beck and Müller-Bloch (2017) established that radical innovations similar to Blockchain 
will only be adopted once resistance is overcome and once the organization sees value in adopting such a system. 
Christensen (1997) noted that disruptive innovation consists of three principal components: 
1. In many industries, the pace of technological progress outstrips customer’s demands for high performing tech-
nologies. As a result, incumbents can over serve the market producing more advanced, feature‐rich products than 
customers need.  
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3. Existing customers and established profit models constrain established firm’s investments in new innovations.  
Blockchain technology has long been described as a disruptive technology (Noker et al., 2017), since it’s beginning 
as an enabler for Bitcoin.  
The focus of the paper is very much from the perspective of individual managers within organisations who would 
be using the Blockchain based systems for their daily roles. Christensen’s principal that disruptive technologies 
are inferior to incumbent products on accepted performance dimensions (e.g. security, scalability) holds through 
in the context of Blockchain and hence provides an additional perspective on organisation’s resistance to Block-
chain. It also illustrates that for any emerging disruptive technology, it must perform on a par with existing tech-
nology to be broadly adopted by incumbents.  
While Christensen (1997) states that established profit models constrain established firms investments in new 
innovations, our findings reveal that this does not appear to be an issue for Blockchain. One can surmise that the 
reason for this is the potential benefits, such as reduced costs and improved transparency that Blockchain can 
potentially enable. Hence, there is very significant demand for such benefits among stakeholders.   
One can extend this principle to other disruptive technologies. In cases where the potential benefits clearly out-
weigh the adoption costs, financial considerations are not an impediment to adoption.  
 It’s clear that incumbents are motivated to adopt disruptive technologies in cases where they believe that failure 
to do so could significantly lead to significant market and business model disruption for them. Critically, it is clear 
that there needs to be significant trust, both in a human and technological context, in any emergent technology..  
 
The findings of this study were similar to resistant to other technologies, e.g. the focus on value and support (Joshi, 
1991; Keen 1981; Krovi 1993; Martinko, Zmud & Henry, 1996). However, our results suggest many of the issues 
impacting on resistance to blockchain-based systems remain elusive. Even with the addition of new blockchain-
 
 
  32 
 
 
specific constructs, the explanatory power of the new model proposed in this study was modest. This is an im-
portant finding in and of itself, as it shows the uncertainty around blockchain amongst financial services profes-
sionals and how/why it may be introduced. 
Despite this modest explanatory power, important insights emerged with implications for practice. First, the per-
ceived benefits have a significant effect on reducing manager resistance. This suggests the lack of blockchain 
knowledge is currently an issue for organizations, who will be required to capture new talent and up-skill employ-
ees for them to understand the benefits. This is likely to take time and resources but appears nonetheless to be a 
vital step if blockchain-based systems are to take hold within organizations. Moreover, it is crucial for organiza-
tions to show support and commitment to blockchain-based systems by providing the necessary resources and 
training for employees to get up to speed and understand the technology. Finally, the perceived support of the 
surrounding environment plays an important role. This suggests suitable communication lines must be open be-
tween governing bodies and organizations to discuss the future of blockchain-based systems. A high level of sup-
port externally from regulatory bodies and internally within an organization, could potentially be a factor to drive 
down user resistance. Therefore, these findings offer organizations suggestions for managing resistance to block-
chain-based systems, with the aim of increasing user adoption to blockchain-based systems. 
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